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We do not have a good measure of the effects of fiscal policy in a recession because the methods that
we use to estimate the effects of fiscal policy — both those using the observed outcomes following
different policies in aggregate data and those studying counterfactuals in fitted model economies --
almost entirely ignore the state of the economy and estimate 'the' government multiplier, which is presumably
a weighted average of the one we care about — the multiplier in a recession — and one we care less
about — the multiplier in an expansion. Notable exceptions to this general claim suggest this difference
is potentially large. Our lack of knowledge stems significantly from the focus on linear dynamics:
VARs and linearized (or close-to-linear) DSGEs. Our lack of knowledge also reflects a lack of data:
deep recessions are few and nonlinearities hard to measure. The lack of statistical power in the estimation
of nonlinear models using aggregate data can be addressed by exploiting estimates of partial-equilibrium
responses in dissaggregated data. Microeconomic estimates of the partial-equilibrium causal effects
of a policy can discipline the causal channels inherent in any DSGE model of the general equilibrium
effects of policy. Microeconomic studies can also provide measures of the dependence of the effects
of a policy on the states of different agents which is a key component of the dependence of the general-equilibrium
effects of fiscal policy on the state of the economy.
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Jonathan-Parker@Kellogg.Northwestern.eduWhen the Obama Administration came into oﬃce in January 2009, the US economy had
been in a recession for more than a year and real GDP was falling at a 6 percent annual
rate. The Federal Reserve’s target for the interest rate on Federal funds was at the zero
lower bound, so that conventional monetary policy had reached its limits. The Obama
Administration pursued continuity of policy with the Bush Administration on stabilization
of ﬁnancial markets (continuing the Troubled Asset Relief Program), but considered cuts in
taxes and increases in government spending and transfers to state governments to maintain
aggregate demand and to increase GDP and employment. The Administration turned to
economists — signiﬁcantly academic economists — to help craft the size and details of the
stimulus package. How much ﬁscal stimulus if any should be enacted? Which taxes should
be cut or what goods should be purchased? How persistent should spending or tax cuts be?
But, almost as useless as no answer, academic economics provided a wide range of answers.
As examples, Krugman (2009) called for much more stimulus spending than actually enacted,
arguing that each additional dollar of government purchases would raise output by 1.5 dollars,
while Barro (2009) argued for no additional spending, writing that from 1943 to 1944 “World
War II raised U.S. defense expenditures by $540 billion (1996 dollars) per year . . . [and] the
war raised real GDP by $430 billion per year . . .the multiplier was 0.8 . . .” The academic
disagreement left policymakers using a multi-equation macroeconomic forecasting model, one
inconsistent with the best practices of modern macroeconomics which identify the eﬀects of
ﬁscal policy either by imposing fewer and more explicit restrictions on time series dynamics
or imposing many more restrictions but based on equilibrium conditions from optimizing
behavior.
In this article, I address why we had so little evidence on the question of interest in early
2009 and how research can proceed to rectify this problem. I consider the central question to
be: how much, if any, ﬁscal stimulus is appropriate when facing a deep recession? That is, I
maintain as an important possibility that countercyclical ﬁscal policy can be eﬀective in the
spirit of Keynes (1936), meaning that increases in government spending or tax cuts may have
signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on output and consumption if and only if there are signiﬁcant slack
resources in the economy. This view of the world corresponds to that of many practitioners
and to that contained in many non-quantitative discussions and textbook descriptions of the
1eﬀects of ﬁscal policy: ﬁscal stimulus, if eﬀective, is only eﬀective when unemployment is high
and capacity utilization low. In this (old) Keynesian view, in recessions, markets are somehow
failing, and these failures can be (probably imperfectly) rectiﬁed through ﬁscal policy which
will return idle resources to work. In an expansion however, market are somehow working and
there are no beneﬁts to expansionary ﬁscal policy as it would primarily raise interest rates
and crowd out private consumption and investment, as in the neoclassical model of economic
ﬂuctuations.
Returning to Barro (2009)’s examples of 1943-44, the unemployment rate during 1942
averaged 4.7%, and was steadily falling reaching 0.7% by 1944. In contrast, in January of
2009 the unemployment rate was 7.8 percent and has steadily risen since, and still stands
at 9.1% more than two years later. If idle resources matter for the multiplier, then the
larger share of idle workers in 2009 may imply a larger multiplier in 2009.1 Unfortunately,
we have very little evidence on whether the government multiplier diﬀers with the state of
the economy. That is, we do not know the eﬃcacy of ﬁscal policy in recessions,w h i c hi s
dispiriting given the central importance of the question.
This article begins by discussing the reasons for our lack of knowledge and then lays
out a methodology for improving our estimate of the eﬃcacy of ﬁscal policy in recessions.
This article is not a review of the literature on the multiplier; several papers contain good
discussions of the extant methods and issues (see Hall (2009), Auerbach and Gale (2010),
Woodford (2011), and Ramey (forthcoming)). Instead, this article is an idiosyncratic, selec-
tive discussion of why we could not answer the question I am posing and what to do about
it.
One major reason for our inability to answer the central question is methodological — our
main methodologies answer a diﬀerent question. A Keynesian-style multiplier — one that is
large in recessions and small at other times — is ruled out in the dynamics of any DSGE
model linearized around a single point and in any standard VAR because it does not allow
state dependence. That is, in almost every DSGE model and VAR analysis, ﬁscal policy is
as eﬀective in a roaring boom as a deep recession.
This point highlights a deeper issue: in many cases where the nonlinearities of DSGE
1Romer (1992) and Gordon and Krenn (2010) also discuss the relevance of the unemployment rate for the
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in the Great Depression.
2models — including new Keynesian models — have been studied, the dynamics are in fact
close to linear in structure. Thus, either most models mismeasure the multiplier in that their
components imply a lack of state-dependence in the government multiplier or the models are
correct and ‘idle’ resources do not matter for the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. Which conclusion
you reach depends on your commitment to extant models.
Turning back to measurement, a second distinct point is that even research that seeks to
estimate the multiplier in recessions actually estimates the marginal multiplier not the total
multiplier. If the marginal multiplier declines with the size of the stimulus, then government
actions - countercyclical ﬁscal policy — will tend to make the marginal multiplier signiﬁcantly
lower than the average multiplier in recessions.
To be clear about the issue with DSGE models, we can, do, and have learned about the
eﬀects of cyclical ﬁscal policy from extant models because the welfare eﬀects of ﬁscal policy
are state dependent. And there are notable extant models that do have an important role
for state dependence, some of which are discussed subsequently.
To be clear about the issue with VARs, we do learn a lot about ‘the’ marginal multiplier
f r o mV A R s .A n dt h e r ea r en o t a b l ee x t a n te m p i r i c al studies that are nonlinear and investigate
the role of idle resources for the marginal eﬀects of government spending, some of which
are discussed subsequently. But while research sometimes ﬁnds evidence of larger eﬀects of
government spending in recessions, the evidence is statistically weak, highlighting the real
reason for our lack of knowledge: lack of data.
The ﬁnal section of this articles considers how economic research can measure the multi-
plier as a function of the state of the economy. From a theoretical perspective, it is feasible
to extend existing DSGE models to include frictions that induce a high degree of curvature
in the cost of supplying output and to extend analysis of these models to study nonlinearities
that cause the elasticity of output with respect to demand to be high in recessions and low in
expansions. Researchers are beginning to investigate which frictions can generate interesting
nonlinearities.
But in terms of quantiﬁcation, the diﬃculties seem more signiﬁcant. First, methodologi-
cally, large changes are necessary to model state dependence in VAR-type empirical models;
much of VAR inference is conditioned on its linear structure. Second, there are simply few
3recessions, and fewer deep recessions, to learn from. The problems of weak inference that
a l r e a d yp l a g u et h el i n e a rV A Rl i t e r a t u r eo nt h em u l t i p l i e ra r em o r es e v e r ef o rt h em o r e
data-intensive estimation of state-dependent dynamics. Thus, while we can build DSGE
models with state dependence that is potentially quantitatively important, inference based
on aggregate data alone is likely to yield imprecise measurement of the multiplier.
But there is another source of evidence: causal evidence from microeconomic studies of
the eﬀect of policies on economic outcomes taking prices as given. Microeconomic studies can
estimate the direct, partial-equilibrium response of agents to a policy — the eﬀect of policy
on microeconomic spending or investment excluding the multiplier for example — which is
an important component of the general-equilibrium response of the economy to the policy.
Further, such studies can measure the dependence of these responses on the states of diﬀer-
ent agents which is an important component of the dependence of the general-equilibrium
response on the state of the economy. These studies represent a largely unexploited source
of information for structural macroeconomic models designed to give quantitative evaluation
of the multiplier. In any quantitative DSGE model, the more links of the implicit causal
chain running from policy to general equilibrium multiplier that are disciplined by explicit
microeconomic estimates of causation, the more conﬁdence we can have in our model-based
interpretations of impulse response functions and model-based counterfactual policy analyses.
This method stands in contrast to most of the current literature which derives quantitative
discipline from best-ﬁtting (linear) aggregate dynamics and/or from external estimates of
structural parameters.
While most of this paper focusses on the quantiﬁcation of the eﬃcacy of ﬁscal policy,
many of the main points are as relevant to the quantiﬁcation of the eﬃcacy of monetary
policy.2
1 What do we know about the multiplier?
To infer the eﬀect of countercyclical ﬁscal policy on the economy, one must estimate a coun-
terfactual history in which the policy is diﬀerent from the observed policy. There are two
2Any study of the eﬀects of government spending is already in part the study of monetary policy since
ﬁscal and monetary policy are necessarily linked.
4main ways this is done: DSGE models that analyze counterfactual policies in ﬁtted model
economies and structural VAR’s that infer the eﬀects of policy from diﬀerences in the evo-
lution of the economy following diﬀerent policies controlling for the state of the aggregate
economy.
The former, DSGE models, are designed to approximate the dynamics of the U.S. economy
and provide structural interpretations of the correlations observed in macroeconomic time
series. The calibrated or ﬁtted models are used to conduct counterfactual policy experiments
and generate estimates of the eﬀects of alternative levels of government transfers or purchases.
The size of the multiplier depends on the model chosen. In the neoclassical model, increases
in government spending raise output through reducing household wealth and increasing their
labor supply. Plausible estimates of the parameters governing this response imply small eﬀects
of government spending on output, typically less than 0.5 and sometimes even negative. More
recently, ﬁscal policy has been studied in New Keynesian models where the eﬀects can be
signiﬁcantly larger, but still typically less than unity.3
The latter, VAR models, use a small number of orthogonality assumptions to ﬁrst identify
changes in policy that are unexpected given the state of the economy and then trace out the
eﬀects of these policy innovations on the evolution of the economy and policy. There are a
large number of interesting and challenging issues in implementation and interpretation of
these ﬁndings, many discussed by Ramey (forthcoming). In terms of magnitude, Hall (2009)
concludes that VARs “. . . ﬁnd fairly consistently that the output multiplier is in the range
from 0.5 to 1.0 and that the consumption multiplier is somewhat positive.”
But almost all DSGE and VAR analyses do not answer the questions asked in the intro-
duction. I now turn to several reasons why this is so. The list I cover is incomplete; most
notably, I do not discuss the limited evidence on what goods to purchase and which taxes
to cut and how these decisions might lead to diﬀerent multipliers from that for government
purchases of good that do not enter the utility function.4
3Examples include Barro and King (1984), Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1992), Ramey and
Shapiro (1998), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007), and Wood-
ford (2011).
4Taylor (forthcoming) discusses the issue of the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of goods or transfers.
52 The problem of ‘the’ multiplier
Almost all the research using either VARs to measure the response of macroeconomic variables
to diﬀerent policies or DSGE models ﬁtted to macroeconomic data employs linear models
or solution methods which has two problems. First, there is a time-invariant government
multiplier that is independent of the state of the economy: ﬁscal policy is assumed as eﬀective
in a recession, when there may be idle resources, as in a boom, when there are not. Second, a
linear model forces a multiplier independent of the size of the stimulus. Econometric studies
estimate the eﬀects of a marginal change. Reasonable arguments suggest that, if the marginal
and total multiplier diﬀer, the marginal is smaller.
2.1 DSGE-based inference
Consider ﬁrst estimates of the government multiplier derived from model economies.5 In prin-
ciple, research using this methodology could be useful for measuring a Keynesian multiplier
as I deﬁne it. In practice, little of it is. Why? Because most research solves the dynamics
of the model by employing a single ﬁrst-order linearization of the non-linear system of equa-
tions. This leads to two related problems for understanding the multiplier, although, for most
models in both the Neoclassical and New Keynesian tradition, the issue is deeper than the
solution method.
A linearized solution to a DSGE model implies that the partial derivative of output or
consumption (or their present discounted values) with respect to government spending or
taxes is the same following a large positive shock to the economy as following a large negative
shock to the economy. The eﬀects of government spending on output or consumption are the
same in a roaring boom, when the unemployment rate is low and capacity utilization high,
as in the depths of a recession, when the unemployment rate is high and capacity utilization
low.
This is not to say that optimal ﬁscal policy cannot stabilize output in a linearized DSGE
model. A choice of ﬁscal policy is the speciﬁcation of a ﬁscal policy rule that depends on
the state variables in the model economy. The amount of government spending can thus be
5Ia mc o n s i d e r i n gt h es t a n d a r dd e ﬁnition of the government multiplier as the eﬀect of a change in govern-
ment spending on output or consumption, which are directly measurable, rather than model-based welfare.
6conditioned on variables such as the level of the capital stock or the output gap, and so can
go down when good shocks hit the economy and up when bad shocks hit the economy. And
the choice of this rule is a critical determinant of welfare and business cycle dynamics, and
countercyclical ﬁscal policy may or may not be optimal in any given model.
The problem arises with quantitative measurement. Government spending or tax policy
does not have the same eﬀect on discounted utility in a recession as in a boom, but it does
h a v et h es a m ee ﬀe c to no u t p u to rc o n s u m p t i o n . 6 The ﬁscal policy rule in a linearized DSGE
is linear and has linear eﬀects on measurable economic quantities. In the linearized model,
the study of optimal ﬁscal policy is based on the answer to the question ‘can the government
raise model-based utility by conditioning government spending linearly on the state of the
economy given that its eﬀects are always the same?’ and not ‘can the government raise output
or consumption more by increasing government spending in a recession than a boom and so
should it?’7
This is not just (or really) a problem in the application of a methodology, it is also a
problem or at least an issue for model speciﬁcation. There are methods for studying economic
dynamics allowing for state dependence, such as linearizing around multiple points, employing
higher-order expansions of the system, and numerical characterization of the full dynamics
of the nonlinear system.8 These methods have been used to evaluate the accuracy of the
approximation provided by the linearized system of equations. And most models — certainly
the textbook neoclassical model and textbook New Keynesian model — are close to linear in
structure so that the linear approximation provides an extremely good characterization of the
actual dynamics of the non-linear system. What does one make of this? On the one hand,
if one has a high degree of conﬁdence in these models, then one believes that the average
multiplier is always the multiplier and that the quantitative recommendations about ﬁscal
policy from these models are correct. In particular this implies that the optimal response to a
6So the optimal policy in response to a shock to the economy in a boom is the same as that to a shock to
the economy in a recession.
7Another way to understand this point is to note that in most modern business cycle theory, the choice of a
policy rule is made to minimize the variance of output of consumption around a given mean. In the Keynesian
proposition considered in the paper, ﬁscal policy is not just about the variance of output or consumption,
but also its level and about its skewness. It admits the possibility that a rule to pursue expansionary policy
only in deep recessions for example could raise average output.
8See for example Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims (2005), and
Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007).
7small boom should be the optimal response to a large recession, scaled-down and in reverse.9
But if one entertains the possibility that the multiplier might be countercyclical, then one
would like models to test that admit this possibility.
And in fact there are notable examples of nonlinear models used to estimate quantitative
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. The most important of these is the literature on ﬁscal policy at the
zero lower bound (Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Eggertsson (2008),
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Relebo (2011), and Woodford (2011)). Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Relebo (2011) in particular show that the government spending multiplier can be very
large — 3 or more — when the interest rate is held constant, such as when nominal interest
rates are zero in a model with sticky prices. The same model delivers multipliers signiﬁcantly
less than one when the interest rate is allowed to vary. But this nonlinearity is subtle: it
depends on the ﬁxity of the interest rate and not on the degree of slack in the economy. A
commitment to maintain a constant real interest rate would lead to the same multiplier in a
boom as in a bust, although the monetary authority may ﬁnd it more costly to pursue such
a policy in a boom and the type of economic shocks that would tend to push the economy
into the zero lower bound are also the type of shocks that tend to cause output to fall and
would cause utilization of capital and labor to decline.
2.2 VAR-based inference
Vector autoregressions provide evidence on the government multiplier by characterizing the
evolution of the economy following changes in ﬁscal policy that are not responses to the
current state of the economy, such as statistical innovations in ﬁscal variables (as in Blanchard
and Perotti (2002)) assumed not caused by the economy or changes in military spending (as
in Ramey and Shapiro (1998)) assumed driven by external factors that do not themselves
impact the economy. These estimates provide estimates of the eﬀect of government spending
— as measured by the innovation in and impulse response of government spending — on the
economy — as measured by the impulse response of output, prices, etc.
But VARs are linear systems. Writing the evolution of the economy as an (inﬁnite-order)
9In any close-to-linear model in which the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act is an optimal response
to a ﬁnancial collapse, an American Disinvestment and Slowdown Act would be an optimal response to a
ﬁnancial boom.
8moving average of structural shocks, the derivative of any variable with respect to any lagged
innovation to ﬁscal policy is independent of the other shocks in that period or any shocks
i na n yn e a r b yp e r i o d s . T h u s ,by assumption, the impulse response to an unexpected or
exogenous increase in government spending is constrained to be the same independent of
the state of the business cycle. Thus, the majority of the VAR literature on the eﬃcacy of
government spending in recessions suﬀers a similar problem to that of its DSGE sibling: the
multiplier is constrained to be independent of the economic situation.
Also, the policy responses to other innovations in the economy are constrained to be linear
in the size of the innovation. Again, writing the VAR in structural moving average form, the
ﬁscal response to any shock to the economy is a linear impulse response, which therefore
responds symmetrically to positive and negative shocks and increases in size linearly with the
size of any given shock to the economy.
Finally, and distinct from estimating the average multiplier over time, VAR impulse re-
sponses also typically estimate the marginal multiplier from an incremental change in govern-
ment spending, not the total multiplier from all countercyclical government spending. That
is, the impulse responses to innovations in policy summarize the eﬀect of a small unpredicted
change in government spending — the eﬀect of a deviation from the average countercyclical
policy — not the change that occurs in responses to usual countercyclical ﬁscal policy — the
total multiplier for countercyclical policy.
Might this be quantitatively important? If the marginal multiplier declines with the size of
the stimulus, then government actions will tend to make the marginal multipliers signiﬁcantly
lower than average multipliers in recessions.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that the government were optimally responding to all economic dis-
turbances, increasing spending or cutting taxes to the point where the present discounted
beneﬁts of a small increase in spending equalled its present discounted costs. Then mea-
surement of the government multiplier derived from shocks to the VAR would be identiﬁed
from errors in implementing the optimal policy given the state of the economy or changes in
policy due to improved understanding of how best to conduct it, or even possibly to policy
experimentation.10 If we were to ask in this world whether the present discounted utility
10This assumes that these things exist and that we are not identifying errors using a misspeciﬁed model of
9of consumption was increased by any small change in ﬁscal policy from the typical optimal
path, the answer would be no. That is, small deviations from the optimal path of government
spending would lead to no change in expected present discounted utility.11
Thus, if the eﬀects of government spending are not linear in the size of the ﬁscal action, the
marginal multiplier for consumption or output in a recession could be signiﬁcantly smaller
than the total multiplier for all countercyclical policy in a recession. If governments are
more shortsighted than agents, more risk averse, or pursue robust policies, in a recession, the
measured, marginal multiplier could be below one while the total multiplier is well above one.
Instead of the issues just discussed, the existing literature has focussed on a diﬀerent
diﬃculty in measuring the eﬃcacy of macroeconomic policy in recessions: measurement of
the eﬀects of policies that are responses to the economic situation. These are policies that we
could consider pursuing again. But the performance of the economy following a policy that
is a response to the economic situation is a mixture of the natural response of the economy
to the economic situation and the response of the economy to the policy. There are two ways
to make the step from estimated structural VAR to quantitative analysis of countercyclical
macroeconomic policy.
One approach is to treat the estimated impulse responses of the economy as a measure
of the diﬀerential eﬀects of diﬀerent policies considered by a policymaker.12 Considering
diﬀerent policy options is considering deviating from an average policy rule. If the policy
shocks identiﬁed by the VAR measure previous deviations from the average policy rule, then
the impulse response of these previous deviations provide a good guide to the eﬀects of
the current deviation. But if the actual eﬀects of policy diﬀer in booms and recession, the
impulse responses estimated in most existing VAR analyses will signiﬁcantly misestimate
the multiplier in a recession because they measures the average of the multiplier in a boom
and the multiplier in a recession.13 Further, because these VAR estimates represent marginal
multipliers, one learns only about the eﬀects of small deviations from rules. That is, supposing
agents’ expectations, such as if we omitted lags, variables, or nonlinearities from our VAR.
11A standard result of ﬁrst-order conditions from government optimization.
12For example, this is the view with respect to monetary policy of Sims (1980) and Leeper, Sims, and Zha
(1996), less explicitly in Romer and Romer (2010), and in much of the debate over the size of the multiplier
in early 2009.
13Again, this is not the only issue here — there are many other assumptions in this approach that are
debated in the VAR literature.
10that estimates could be conditioned on being in a recession, even small estimated marginal
multipliers would at most imply that government spending responses to recessions be scaled
back not that they be abandoned.
The other use of VARs in the study of stabilization policy is as part of identiﬁcation and
estimation of a DSGE model. The parameters of a DSGE model are chosen to make the causal
eﬀects of shocks in the DSGE as consistent as possible with those of the estimated impulse
responses to one or more structural shocks in the structural VAR.14 This approach imposes
more theoretical assumptions on the impulse responses, but gives them structural interpreta-
tions that permit counterfactual analysis and analysis of optimal policy. This methodology
is tractable and elegant, but as currently implemented relies heavily on the linearity of both
VAR and DSGE dynamics — the irrelevance of the unidentiﬁed shocks and of the state of the
economy more generally is central to the identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of policy. To the extent
that the real world has diﬀerent economic responses to policy in diﬀerent economic situations,
this aspect of the data is never bought to the DSGE model and is ignored in estimation and
inference.
There are of course exceptions to the general rule that VAR analysis has not been con-
cerned with the nonlinear eﬀects of policy and, as was the case for DSGE models, the extant
evidence suggests that nonlinearities may be quite important. While some earlier work esti-
mates VARs over sub-periods to investigate diﬀerences in impulse responses in diﬀerent peri-
ods, the most signiﬁcant work to date is Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010), which employs
a smooth transition structural VAR in which the dynamics of the economy are characterized
by a time-varying linear combination of two diﬀerent linear autoregressive structures.15 In
any period, three variables — output, government purchases, and taxes — are determined by a
weighted average of two diﬀerent linear autoregressive models with weights depending on a
seven-quarter moving average of output growth. This gives the model a non-linear structure,
allowing estimation of multipliers that diﬀer in recessions and in booms but also losing many
of the standard beneﬁts of VARs.
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) ﬁnds that multipliers are similar on impact in reces-
14This methodology and issues originate as discussions in the literature on monetary policy, see Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998).
15Again, this article is not a survey, but see also Perotti (1999), Tagkalakis (2008), and Taylor (forthcoming).
11sions and expansions, but that the impulse responses are quite diﬀerent, implying cumulative
multipliers over 5 years of 0 to 0.5 in a boom and 1 to 1.5 in a recession. While this evidence
is consistent with the importance of state-dependence in the eﬃcacy of ﬁscal policy, the paper
raises many issues about how best to statistically model nonlinear dynamics. In particular,
the Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) approach smooths the impulse responses so that the
data in normal times helps to inform the dynamics in both boom times and recessions.
This ﬁnal point directs us to the central diﬃculty confronting VAR-based inference: lack
of data. We have few severe recessions from which to learn (although we could also learn from
avoided severe recessions), and each (potential) recession has a diﬀerent set of causal factors,
ad i ﬀerent set of contemporaneous confounding factors, and diﬀerent policies themselves —
diﬀerent spending on diﬀerent goods and diﬀerent types of tax changes, both coupled with
diﬀerent monetary policy responses. Thus, there is little information in macroeconomic data
alone to inform policy.16
O n er e s p o n s et ot h el a c ko fd a t ai st os t u d ym o r ec a r e f u l l yt h ed a t at h a tw ed oh a v e .A
vector autoregression constructs policy innovations by estimating expectations from small sets
of aggregate variables and bases counterfactuals (the world without a shock) on outcomes
following diﬀerent levels of this small set of aggregate variables. Historical analysis can
examine more information than that contained in limited aggregate data and decide with
more precision — although more judgement — what a given counterfactual might look like. As
a concrete example, the statistics from the ﬁnancial sector that portended poor performance
in this sector and possibly the economy, such as issuance of asset backed securities and
various credit spreads, are typically excluded from VARs yet were taken into consideration
b yp o l i c y m a k e r sa n dp r i v a t ea g e n t si n2 0 0 7a n d2 0 0 8 . N o t a b l ee x a m p l e so ft h i sa p p r o a c h
include Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Romer and Romer (2010), as well as a vast amount of
research on the Great Depression. While historical analysis can potentially better determine
the baseline expected dynamics of output and government spending and how they both change
over time, the use of historical evidence is to some extent inherently subjective.17
16This is why many studies consider additional data — most commonly data from policy during expansions
— to improve power, but, as I am arguing, this may come at the cost of bias.
17Of course in practice so too is the choice of tastes and technology in a DSGE model and the choice of
variables in a VAR.
12Another response to the lack of data is to use asset market data to better measure market
expectations, or surveys of expectations to better measure counterfactuals. As examples,
Ramey (2011) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) both use surveys of professional
forecasters and Fisher and Peters (2009) uses information from asset markets on the returns
on the stocks of defense contractors to better measure the arrival of information about changes
in government spending.18 Finally, data from more countries can give more information, as
in Perotti (1999) and Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2010). But few countries have aggregate
data of the quality and length of that in the U.S., and diﬀerent countries likely have diﬀerent
multipliers because they diﬀer in many ways such as monetary policy regimes, tax systems,
and labor market ﬂexibility to name just a few.19
While all of these approaches are useful in that they bring more information to bear, the
next section describes a diﬀerent approach to increasing the information used in inference:
the use of estimates from microeconomic studies to discipline steps in the causal chains from
policy to outcomes that are embedded in any macroeconomic model.
3 Measuring the multiplier in a recession
To understand whether the multiplier for ﬁscal policy diﬀers in booms and recession, we need
to identify and measure the extent to which the eﬀects of policy are state dependent. From a
theoretical perspective, it seems feasible to extend existing DSGE models to include frictions
that induce strong curvature or a kink in the cost of supplying output and that cause the elas-
ticity of output with respect to demand to be high in recessions and low in expansions. While
solution methods for such models exist, for practical use they may require reﬁnement.20 And
while it is not obvious which frictions are the right ones, these issues seem ripe for research.
As illustrated by the literature on the zero lower bound, such curvature can be induced by
constraints which occasionally bind. Are there relevant constraints that generate curvature
and slack resources when binding? Informational frictions seem like plausible candidates;
18See also Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) which uses asset price data to study monetary policy.
19Favero, Giavazzi, and Perego (2011) studies multipliers across countries and relates the diﬀerent estimates
to diﬀerent country characteristics, some of which are time-varying states.
20The solution methods already exist, "but oh man is that hard in practice!" (Christiano (personal com-
munication)).
13both the Great Depression and the 2008-2009 recession suggest that informational frictions
in ﬁnancial markets might be a promising starting point for investigation.21
But while theoretical models seem poised to investigate nonlinearities, the diﬃculties in
extending inference to nonlinear environments are more serious. Asymptotically, given a
correct model, this statement is of course incorrect. Nonlinear (statistical or DSGE) models
can be estimated structurally from informative moments from the data. But data are limited.
Research using VARs has made enormous strides in extracting the economic evolution caused
by an innovation to a well-identiﬁed structural shock, such as monetary or ﬁscal policy, but
many of these steps rely heavily on the linear structure of the VAR.22 For example, linearity
is required by current methods to parse the impulse response to an identiﬁed shock when one
is unable to identify the remaining shocks in the system and to study this response or use it to
estimate a DSGE model. Nonlinear methods are far more demanding of the data, or, worse,
far more reliant on the speciﬁc functional forms of the model being estimated. In a model
in which the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy are allowed to diﬀer across states of the economy, more
parameters are estimated from the data than if the eﬀects are constrained to be the same
across states. Thus, while we can build DSGE models in which state dependence is potentially
quantitatively important, inference based on aggregate dynamics, while still informative, is
alone unlikely to be suﬃcient to give precise measurement of the multiplier.
In considering the use of additional information for measurement of the multiplier, two
properties are desirable: independence from macroeconomic data and relevance to the mul-
tiplier.23 Independence is desirable as it provides some guard against overﬁtting; the model
can be estimated on one set of data and tested on the macroeconomic dynamics. Current
practice in macroeconomics, following Prescott (1986) among others, often exploits indepen-
dent sources of information by setting model parameters on the basis of trend relationships in
aggregate data or cross-sectional estimates. But since every model is misspeciﬁed, the model
21While the ﬁnance literature has lots of nonlinearity, macroeconomic models with ﬁnancial frictions do not.
In the canonical macroeconomic model with ﬁnancial frictions, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), the constraints
always bind so that the model is close to linear — the constraint moves amplifying ﬂuctuations but dynamics
are linear. Older work contains nonlinearities: Mankiw (1986) for example contains an important nonlinearity
but is not readily estimable. And much current work is incorporating occassionally-binding constraints into
macroeconomic models and studying non-linear eﬀects. See Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011) for an example
with ﬁnancial constraints.
22N o tt h a ta l li s s u e sh a v eb e e nr e s o l v e d ,j u s tt h a tm a n yi s s u e sh a v eb e e nn i c e l yr e s o l v e d .
23I use the term independence in the sense used by Prescott (1986).
14parameters that maximize ﬁtf o ro n ea s p e c to ft h er e a lw o r l dm a yn o tm a x i m i z eﬁt or applica-
bility of the model for another. Thus, relevance is also desirable. For example, cross-sectional
estimates of parameters based on variation in the data that is closely related to the variation
in ﬁscal policy in question are likely to be useful for ﬁtting and understanding the macroeco-
nomic dynamics following this ﬁscal policy. But even relevant variation has the problem that,
when models are misspeciﬁed, best-ﬁtting “structural” parameters are generally not invariant
across environments.
An alternative approach when available is to base the parameters of the DSGE model
on evidence from cleanly-identiﬁed estimates of the partial-equilibrium causal eﬀects of poli-
cies. Evidence (or moments) from well-identiﬁed microeconomic studies of causation can
satisfy both independence and relevance, and, because they can avoid imposing model-based
restrictions, they are invariant across environments.24 When aggregate state dependence is
imprecisely measured in aggregate data alone, model-based inference about the multiplier can
be made more precise by estimating the parameters of the model so that experiments in the
model that replicate those in microeconomic studies of partial-equilibrium causal relation-
ships match the causal patterns found in the microeconomic studies. Most helpful are studies
of causal relationships that are central to the impact of the policy in general equilibrium.
Further, to the extent that aggregate nonlinearity is due to the fact that individual behav-
ior is dependent on the aggregate state (rather than dependent on individual-level states,
the distribution of which are part of the aggregate state), then even more informative are
cross-sectional analyses at times of deep recession that can be contrasted to analyses at more
normal times.25
Relatedly, to the extent that the state-dependence in the macroeconomic model follows
from a state-dependence at the microeconomic level, microeconomic studies can measure
the importance of this nonlinearity at the microeconomic level. That is, microeconomic
24That is, estimates of causation can be (largely) model independent so that one can (largely) avoid model
misspeciﬁcation in the estimation in the cross-sectional data. Instead, more relevant estimates are desirable
because they provide statistical power more useful for identifying the dynamics of interest.
25Like linear times series analysis, causal eﬀects that do not depend on aggregate state are still informative
and add information. Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011) for example survey microeconomic estimates
of labor supply elasticities which is useful information for DSGE’s. But the paper ignores possible state
dependence and averages across all studies. It would be useful to know whether the elasticity varies with the
state of the business cycle.
15studies can measure the dependence of agents’ responses on their states which is an important
component of the dependence of the general-equilibrium response on the state of the economy.
For example, if the nonlinearity in the macroeconomic model follows from variations in the
extent to which a given constraint binds for agents, then the macroeconomic model can be
made more quantitatively relevant if the behavior of constrained and unconstrained agents
in the DSGE model matches the microeconomic evidence on the behavior of constrained and
unconstrained agents.
Consider the example of the countercyclical tax policy. Johnson, Parker, and Souleles
(2006) and Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2011) estimate the eﬀect of the receipt
of a Federal economic stimulus tax rebate on household spending. The estimation identiﬁes
the causal eﬀect from the eﬀective randomization in the timing of the disbursement of the
rebates distributed in the recessions of 2001 and 2008. The papers ﬁnd that the distribution
of the rebates caused an economically-signiﬁcant partial-equilibrium increase in the aggregate
demand for consumption of nondurable goods (and some services) of a quarter to a third of
the amount of the rebates, an amount which is much larger than that consistent with the
models of household behavior under rational expectations that are embedded in both the
neoclassical and New Keynesian models.26 It seems unlikely that standard DSGE models
that are inconsistent with this measured household response provide accurate quantitative
evaluations of the economic dynamics following this policy or accurate measurements of the
multiplier in particular.
Further, many papers including Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) ﬁnd evidence that
the spending responses of households are stronger among low-income or low-asset households.
This ﬁnding reveals state dependence in behavior at the microeconomic level, suggesting state
dependence at the macroeconomic level. Speciﬁcally, variations in the share of households
with low levels of liquid wealth or income may change the aggregate eﬀects of ﬁscal pol-
icy, which suggests that liquidity constraints or incomplete markets across households are a
potentially-important source of nonlinearity for a DSGE.27 This exempliﬁes the standard way
26Hinting at some form of state dependence, Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) ﬁnds statistically weak
evidence of no response in spending on durable goods while Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2011)
ﬁnds statistically stronger evidence of economically large increases in spending on durable goods.
27Foreshadowing issues discussed subsequently, Krusell and Smith (1998) show that, in a DSGE model
with incomplete markets and borrowing constraints, the share of households that are constrained does aﬀect
16in which microeconomic ﬁndings often inform macroeconomic modelling.
Several (preliminary at writing) papers more directly build models for the study of ﬁscal
policy that are designed and parameterized to be consistent with the microeconomic evidence
on the eﬀects of tax rebates on consumption demand.28 Kaplan and Violante (2011) is
a partial equilibrium model that focuses on how the state of the economy inﬂuences the
quantitative response of aggregate demand to the policy. In the model, heterogeneous life-
cycle households have access to a liquid asset and an illiquid asset with a higher rate of return
that can be accessed only by paying a transaction cost. Consumers are impatient between
adjustments and so consume at high rates from their liquid assets, and thus from liquid asset
infusions like tax rebates. Kaplan and Violante (2011) ﬁnds signiﬁcant state dependence: the
model response of consumption demand to tax rebate policies varies by a factor of two across
diﬀerent economic scenarios considered.
In contrast, Huntley and Michelangeli (2010) and Oh and Reis (2011) study the linear
dynamics of DSGE models — so that the eﬀects of the ﬁscal program are constrained to be
the same in recessions and in booms — but discipline the models to match the microeconomic
evidence on the additional spending caused by tax rebates — so that one of the main channels
through which the rebates eﬀect the economy is disciplined by the causal microeconomic
evidence. Huntley and Michelangeli (2010) studies a heterogeneous-agent economy with in-
complete markets and borrowing constraints (as in Aiyagari (1994)). Oh and Reis (2011)
also include nominal rigidities. The papers illustrate nicely how moments that represent
model-free estimates of causation can be used to ﬁt DSGE models.
Huntley and Michelangeli (2010) estimates that the multiplier for a tax rebate like the
ones implemented is very small (less than 0.2) and the eﬀect of the rebate transitory.29 On
the one hand, one might have expected the ﬁtted model to produce a larger-than-average
multiplier because the model is ﬁt to data from a recession, the state of the world in which
the policy might have larger impact. On the other hand Huntley and Michelangeli (2010)
chooses model features that match the microeconomic evidence without other ineﬃciencies
macroeconomic dynamics but the incomplete markets and changing number of constrained agents does not
make the dynamics of the model quantitatively non-linear.
28See also Reis (2006).
29Huntley and Michelangeli (2010) is a moving target at this point, but Taylor (forthcoming) reaches similar
conclusions.
17that could generate a role for policy to improve the allocation of ineﬃciently used (or unused)
productive resources. So the nonlinear model is probably close to linear.30
These results suggest that if the multiplier is to vary with the state of the business cycle
in a DSGE model, nonlinearities need to come from other or additional sources besides
household liquidity constraints, such as either an aggregate constraint that, like the zero
lower bound, binds occasionally or agent-speciﬁc constraints that generate an important role
for idle resources (failures to make productive transactions or matches). Finally, this example
illustrates the limits of additional evidence from microeconomic studies: it only provide
information about microeconomic eﬀects and leaves the rest of the economy for speciﬁcation
by the researcher.
Another example of the use of estimates of relevant causal eﬀects from disaggregated data
i sN a k a m u r aa n dS t e i n s s o n( 2 0 1 1 ). This paper estimates the eﬀect of an increase in Federal
military spending in a given U.S. state on output in that U.S. state relative to spending and
outcomes in other states. Like most studies that use cross-sectional variation, this measured
eﬀect is not a measure of the national multiplier. A far larger share of spending in a state
goes to goods produced outside of that state than for the country as a whole; Federal spend-
ing aﬀects the Federal budget constraint and so the tax ramiﬁcations of higher spending
in one state are shared across states; ﬁnally, common economic reactions to the aggregate
policy such as monetary policy responses are not captured by the cross-state diﬀerence in
outcomes. However, these features can be viewed as advantages. By exploiting the greater
amount of variation in the cross-state data, Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) estimates rea-
sonably precisely a statistic that is both independent of aggregate dynamics and relevant for
the aggregate government multiplier. In fact, it also turns out that the statistic provides a
sharp test among a set of quantitative DSGE models, and one that is largely independent
of the monetary policy rule in each model. A New Keynesian DSGE model with nonsep-
arable preferences between consumption and leisure matches the cross-sectional impact of
government spending well while the baseline New Keynesian model and various variants of
the neoclassical model do not.
While Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) does not analyze possibly nonlinearities or state
30This is also the case for Oh and Reis (2011). The near-linearity again conﬁrms a main ﬁnding of Krusell
and Smith (1998).
18dependence in the DSGE models considered, the paper does investigate whether the estimated
statistic — the impact of state-speciﬁc government spending on state-speciﬁc output and
employment — varies with the unemployment rate of the U.S. economy in a given period.
The eﬀects of military spending on output and employment are roughly twice as large as in
t i m e si nw h i c ht h en a t i o n a lu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ei sa b o v ei t sm e d i a na sw h e ni ti sb e l o wi t s
median. Thus this evidence also suggests an important empirical role for slack resources, one
that structural modelling at the moment does not match and one which again provides both
motivation for such a nonlinear DSGE model and some clues as to what model ingredients
might be required.
While I discuss these few examples, there any many papers that estimate the eﬀects of
ﬁscal stabilization policies on partial-equilibrium behaviors or outcomes, including Mian and
Suﬁ (2010), Nekarda and Ramey (2011), and House and Shapiro (2008), that could be used
to provide more discipline for macroeconomic modelling. There are also many more papers
in macroeconomics that employ microeconomic evidence to discipline their theoretical or
quantitative investigations. The point of this section is not to survey either set of papers, but
to emphasize that cleanly-identiﬁed microeconomic estimates of partial-equilibrium causal
eﬀects of policies are both independent and relevant and so can provide additional evidence
to improve the informativeness of model-based estimates of the size of the multiplier in
recessions.
4C o n c l u s i o n
To date, much recent work on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy imposes that its impact on consump-
tion, output and other economic outcomes is the same in a booming economy as in the depths
of a recession. Estimates based on this assumption were used to evaluate the potential eﬀects
of ﬁscal policy in the Great Recession. It seems desirable to relax this assumption. Some
theoretical and some empirical work that allows state-dependence in the eﬀects of policy
suggests that state dependence may be quite important, and that recessions, or only some
recessions, may be times when ﬁscal policy is particularly potent. But an important diﬃculty
with further investigation is the limited macroeconomic data available on the eﬀects of policy
19in recessions (or deep recessions).
Thus, this article argues that a fruitful avenue for ongoing and future research is to build
(possibly highly) nonlinear models and match their implications not just to correlations
in aggregate or microeconomic data, but also to estimates from microeconomic studies of
the causal eﬀects of policies on economic outcomes taking prices as given. Microeconomic
studies can estimate for example the direct impact of countercyclical policy on demand,
which measures the eﬀect of policy on microeconomic spending and investment, excluding
the multiplier. These studies provide largely unexploited quantitative discipline for structural
macroeconomic models designed to give quantitative evaluation of the multiplier.
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